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Updates from the International
and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals
International Criminal Court
Prosecutor Unable to Proceed
with Preliminary Examination in
Palestine
On April 3, 2012, the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) announced that it
was unable to continue its preliminary
examination in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories because it did not have authority
to determine whether Palestine qualified as
a “state.” The Rome Statute, the founding
treaty of the ICC, requires such a classification before the Court may exercise jurisdiction. Instead, the OTP decided that only
relevant UN bodies or the ICC Assembly
of States Parties (ASP) had competence to
make that determination. The Prosecutor’s
decision raises a new legal question that the
Rome Statute does not appear to answer:
who has authority to determine whether
Palestine qualifies as a state for the purposes of the Court’s jurisdiction?
The question of Palestinian statehood
in the ICC context arose after January 22,
2009, when Palestine lodged a declaration
accepting ICC jurisdiction under Article
12(3) of the Rome Statute. Specifically,
Palestine sought an ICC investigation into
alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed during Operation
“Cast Lead,” the 2008-2009 Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. ICC jurisdiction
requires that either a “State” (under Article
12) or the UN Security Council (under
Article 13(b)) confer jurisdiction. Given
that the UN Security Council has not
referred the situation in Palestine to the
ICC and Palestine has not become a State
Party to the Rome Statute, the only way
to obtain ICC jurisdiction is through an
Article 12(3) ad hoc declaration. Article
12(3) provides for acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by a “State which is not Party
to this Statute,” and the present debate
revolves around whether Palestine qualifies as such a state.
In response to the OTP’s decision, some
legal scholars and civil society organizations have argued that the OTP should
have referred the question to ICC judges

for a judicial determination rather than
to the UN or ASP for a political decision.
Advocates of the judicial approach point to
Article 19(3) of the Rome Statute, which
provides that “the Prosecutor may seek a
ruling from the Court regarding a question
of jurisdiction.” ICC jurisdiction could
arguably be considered a question of fact
that must be submitted to the judges for an
impartial judicial decision.
Supporters of the judicial approach
also fear that a political determination T
will
indefinitely deny victims an opportunity
for justice while political bodies attempt
to resolve the complex issue of Palestinian
statehood. Referring the decision to political bodies could be viewed as a delay tactic
intended to avoid making a politically
unpopular decision. There are also concerns that leaving this decision to political
bodies will undermine the judicial independence of the Court. The Court’s limited
jurisdiction already projects an impression
of bias because all of its investigations are
currently in Africa, and any political influence over the decision to open an investigation could exacerbate this problem.
On the other hand, some civil society
organizations supported the OTP’s decision
to refer the question to the UN or the ASP.
Supporters of the political approach argue
that UN bodies must recognize Palestine as
a state before it qualifies as a state capable
of accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC. By
contrast, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor questioned the role of
any international bodies, whether political
or judicial, stating: “[i]f the [Palestinian
Authority] has any grievance, the proper
way to deal with it is to talk to Israel and
try to sort this out directly. Resorting to the
ICC or to the UN or to any far away institution . . . that’s just a waste of time.”
The OTP’s decision comes more than
three years after Palestine accepted ICC
jurisdiction. This delay has denied victims
their day in court and made preservation
and collection of evidence more difficult.
As the ICC continues to develop and face
new legal questions, it is important for the
Court to resolve these issues in a way that
maintains the independence of the Court
35

and respects its goal to provide a forum
where victims have access to justice in a
timely manner.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.

ICC Delivers Historic Decision
Reparations for Victims in the
Case of Convicted Congolese
Warlord Thomas Lubanga
he

on

In yet another historic first for the
International Criminal Court (ICC) as it
enters the second decade of its existence,
the Court—specifically, Trial Chamber
I—has decided upon a set of guiding
principles to be applied to reparations for
victims of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The
Chamber issued its decision in August
2012 in the context in of the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), in the case of Mr. Lubanga, former President of the Union des Patriotes
Congolais and Commander-in-Chief of its
military wing, Force patriotique pour la
liberation du Congo (FPLC). Mr. Lubanga
was convicted in March 2012 of committing, as co-perpetrator, war crimes consisting of enlisting and conscripting children
under the age of fifteen years and using
them to participate actively in armed conflict not of an international character in the
DRC—a crime punishable under Article
8 of the Rome Statute (RS), the Court’s
founding document. In July 2012, Mr.
Lubanga was sentenced to a total period of
fourteen years of imprisonment.
In rendering its decision, the threejudge panel of the Chamber sought to
establish reparations applicable to the
Lubanga case specifically, which—
depending on the scope and extent of
damage, loss, and injury—may include
restitution, compensation, and/or rehabilitation, as well as other reparations of a
symbolic, preventative, or transformative
value. According to the panel, the very
need for reparations reflects a growing
consensus among the Court’s architects,
advocates, and stakeholders that “there is
a need to go beyond the notion of punitive
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justice, towards a solution which is more
inclusive, encourages participation, and
recognises [sic] the need to provide effective remedies for victims,” which, as the
panel recognized, is a “well-established
and basic human right.” Though there is
indeed a punitive element to reparations,
which require those responsible to repair
the harm they caused, they are ultimately
intended to relieve suffering, afford a more
tangible measure of justice, and contribute
to the rebirth of affected communities. As
a unique and key feature of proceedings,
the success and viability of the reparations system is, from the perspective of
the panel, fundamental to the success and
viability of the Court itself.

are complicated… operate on a number of
levels… can extend over a long period of
time… [and] require a specialist, integrated
and multidisciplinary approach.” When
considering children, the Court shall use as
guidance the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which enshrines the fundamental
principle of the “best interests of the child.”
Reparations shall take into account the age
of the child and, in the case of child soldiers,
should emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration, and seek to maximize the child’s
personality, talents, and abilities.

reparations system when the convicted
individual is declared indigent. The Fund
currently maintains a reserve for reparations totaling roughly $1.5 million USD.
85 victims have put forth claims in the case
of Mr. Lubanga, while “many more” may
be eligible. The Fund’s leadership hailed
the decision, and welcomes the role it will
play. Some external stakeholders, however,
are more cautiously optimistic, and will
monitor the process closely to ensure the
Court successfully delivers on the promises to victims contained in the decision.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law and Co-Editor-in-Chief of
the Human Rights Brief, wrote this column.

Within this framework, the three-judge
panel set forth the following principles
intended to guide a proportional, adequate,
and prompt reparations system in the
Lubanga case—a system designed to promote reconciliation, reflect local cultural or
customary values (unless discriminatory),
and be self-sustaining. According to the
panel, the pool of those eligible includes
both direct and indirect victims, which in
turn includes (1) family members with a
close personal relationship to direct victims,
(2) any individual who attempted to prevent
or intervene in the commission of the crimes
for which Mr. Lubanga was convicted, and
(3) those who suffered personal harm as a
the result of the crimes. Reparations may
also be granted to individuals, collectives
of individuals, or to legal entities, which
inter alia includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), charitable and non-profit
organizations, schools, hospitals, cooperatives, or microfinance institutions.

According to the panel, all damage,
loss, or injury that forms the basis of a
reparations claim must have flowed from
the specific crimes for which Mr. Lubanga
was convicted. There is no mention in either
the Rome State or ICC Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the standard the Court
must adopt in assessing the causal chain
of a reparations claim, nor is there any
settled standard in international law. In this
specific case, however, the panel found that
the Court may adopt the “direct” or “immediate effects” standards, as well as the less
rigid “proximate cause” standard. That is,
the Court may grant a reparations claim
provided (1) there exists a “but/for” relationship between the crime and the harm
and (2) the crimes for where Mr. Lubanga
was convicted were the proximate cause of
the harm for which reparations were sought.
The standard for evaluating claims of proximate cause is, according to the panel, “a
less exacting standard” than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, and instead approaches
the standard of “balance of probabilities”
without at all compromising the fair trial
rights of the convicted individual.

The panel also set forth a general policy
against discrimination or stigmatization
based on whether the victim participated
in proceedings, or based on such characteristics as gender, age, race, colour [sic],
language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, sexual orientation, national,
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth, or
other status. However, this does not limit
the Court from assigning priority to victims
who are particularly vulnerable or are in
need of urgent assistance or medical care,
such as children dealing with severe trauma,
the elderly, those with disabilities, and the
victims of sexual or gender violence. With
regard to victims or sexual- or gender-based
violence, the Court shall tailor its reparations awards to reflect acknowledgement
that “the consequences of these crimes

While the panel made clear that these
principles and procedures were “limited to
the circumstances of the present case” and
was “not intended to affect” future cases,
its decision will nonetheless lay a foundation for what could eventually become an
extensive line of jurisprudence coming
out of the Court. The reparations system
produced by this particular decision will
undoubtedly provide guidance and inform
decisions on victims reparations moving
forward. In the present case, the panel
declared Mr. Lubanga indigent, which triggers the use of the Trust Fund for Victims
(TFV)—considered the first of its kind
in the international justice landscape—
which manages resources derived from
voluntary contributions from states and
individuals to fulfill the Court-imposed
36

Ad Hoc Tribunals
Equal Treatment for Genocidaires:
Sentence Enforcement at the
ICTY and ICTR
As the years since the atrocities of the
1990s in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
increase, many of those convicted by
the international tribunals serving sentences throughout Europe and Africa have
applied for and been granted early release.
Government officials and the victims of the
conflicts have expressed concern and dismay
over these early releases, often questioning
the rationale of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) for even considering early
release. Yet the tribunals are tasked with
ensuring fair and equal treatment of convicted persons, and have consistently upheld
the right of convicted persons to seek early
release, if specific criteria are satisfied. This
right is not consistently available, however,
and this inconsistency has the potential to
result in unequal sentence enforcement.
As with the defense principles of due
process and equality of arms prior to conviction, equality in sentence enforcement
after conviction must operate free from a
desire for retribution and deterrence based
solely on the nature of the crime, taking into
account the rights of the convicted and his
or her ability to rehabilitate. This approach
is not always popular, as made clear in the
recent statements of Rwanda’s Prosecutor
General, Martin Ngoga, who advocated that
the ICTR reexamine the concept of allowing early release for convicted genocidaires.
In opposing the three early releases granted
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by the ICTR thus far, Mr. Ngoga questioned
the relevance of good conduct in prison
after one has committed the crime of genocide. If early releases are to be allowed, he
advocates a precursory genuine apology
to survivors and the community. Croatia’s
president Ivo Josipovic also questioned the
appropriateness of early release from the
ICTY, advocating a base standard of serving
full sentences with rare exception.
As provided in the ICTR and ICTY
Statutes, when a person convicted by a tribunal requests early release, that tribunal’s
President decides on the appropriateness
of the release based on recommendations
from the state where the sentence is being
served, after consultation with the Prosecutor
and sentencing Chambers. The Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR and
the ICTY provide factors that, inter alia,
the President must take into account in
this decision, including the gravity of the
person’s crime(s), the treatment of similarly
situated prisoners, the person’s demonstrated
rehabilitation, and any cooperation with the
Prosecutor on other cases. The tribunals also
mandate that the convicted party complete
two-thirds of his or her sentence before it will
consider a petition for early release.
Another important prerequisite to
any petition for early release is that the
state enforcing the person’s sentence must
approve a request for early release under
its own law. This requirement is laid out in
tribunal statutes and in each state’s sentence
enforcement agreement (see Albania’s, for
example), and is based on the statutory
requirement that the enforcing state’s laws
govern the sentences of those convicted
by a tribunal. The wide variability of these
domestic laws presents a significant challenge to equal enforcement of sentences. As
observed by Klaus Hoffman, former Legal
Officer at the ICTY, two men convicted of
the same crime and sentenced to life imprisonment may have drastically different experiences depending on the country where
they serve their sentences. One man may
secure early release in 15 years, while the
other may stay in prison for his entire life.
The potential for unequal sentence
enforcement is a negative side effect of
state-enforced tribunal sentences, and hints
at the benefits of a sentence enforcement
standardization effort on the part of the
international community. As with so many
of the concerns raised in these early years of
international criminal jurisprudence, equality

of enforcement is a weighty issue for the
future credibility of the ICTY and the ICTR,
and for the International Criminal Court
when the tribunals complete their mandates.
Effective standardization would ideally find
a delicate three-way balance between promoting effective punishment while equally
enforcing sentences, respecting the frustrations of victims at the early release of a
perpetrator, and upholding the sovereignty of
the state enforcing the sentence.

ADC-ICTY Releases First DefenseFocused Legacy Document
In a notable milestone for the legacy of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Association
for Defense Council Practicing before the
ICTY (ADC-ICTY) announced the release
of its “Manual on International Criminal
Defense” in late 2011, officially launching it in February 2012. The Manual is
the product of the EU-funded War Crimes
Justice Project, a joint effort by the ADCICTY and UN Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute, coordinated
by the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe. Following a path
laid clear by the Tribunal’s “ICTY Manual
on Developed Practices (2009),” the Manual
on International Criminal Defense (Manual)
is the first legacy document of its kind to
function as a treatise on international criminal defense proceedings before the ICTY.
The Manual is specifically tailored to
the unique challenges of defense activities
before the ICTY and is intended to be of
practical use for domestic war crimes courts
in the region of the Former Yugoslavia. It is
also designed to be a resource for international criminal defense jurisprudence writ
large. The Manual’s diverse pool of authors
are defense lawyers who have practiced
before the ICTY and national courts in the
region of the Former Yugoslavia, representing the collective defense experience of the
ADC-ICTY over its decade of existence, as
well as the experience of previous defense
counsel since the founding of the ICTY.
The Manual presents prose-based explanations and case-specific interpretations
of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (RPEs), information that would
take months to compile for even an experienced defense lawyer beginning practice
at the ICTY. The explanations are tailored
to reflect the ICTY’s blend of civil and
common law traditions, providing lawyers
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with extensive practice experience in either
tradition with an expedited primer in an
often unfamiliar system of procedure. This
civil law-common law blend has presented
difficult hurdles since the ICTY’s first case,
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, where both the
Accused’s counsel and the Trial Chamber
came from civil law systems in which a
guilty plea is typically an evidentiary consideration for the court, rather than a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Accused’s
counsel and the judges had to learn the
common law concept of a plea agreement
to practice before the Tribunal, as required
by Rule 62 ter of the RPEs. The Manual
effectively reduces the barriers to entry in a
legal practice area typically hampered by a
lack of experienced legal professionals.
Structurally, the Manual outlines every
stage of a defense proceeding before the
Tribunal, from initial indictment through
post-conviction appeals in domestic legal
systems carrying out ICTY sentences. Each
chapter provides practical tips from ICTY
cases to explain the applicable RPEs and
novel legal concepts, such as Joint Criminal
Enterprise, that have emerged more recently.
Furthermore, the Manual makes occasional
distinctions between ICTY practices and
those adopted by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.
Recognizing the broad stakes of international criminal trials, the Manual begins
with an extensive look at reasonable doubt,
the prosecution’s standard of proof for ultimate guilt and underlying facts, highlighting the ICTY’s strict interpretation of the
presumption of innocence. Following an
explanation of affirmative defenses, the
Manual provides a guide to developing a
case theory and strategy, complete with a
chapter on the logistics of defense investigations that details methods for adequately
taking advantage of the defense’s reliance
on the Office of the Prosecutor when building a defense, while also conducting independent investigations. The Manual then
provides a basic approach to structuring a
legal argument, before extensively covering
the ICTY’s permissive standards for accepting evidence, and noting the criticism this
approach often faces. The use of witnesses
is covered next, followed by an explanation of the witness examination process.
The Manual then explains the plea agreement concept and the associated sentencing
process, finishing with the appeals process,
and various post-conviction issues.
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The ICTY’s contribution to the budding
field of international criminal defense is
enduring and highly regarded, as evidenced
in frequent citation by the other ad hoc and
hybrid courts and the International Criminal
Court. The ICTY was the first international
criminal justice court, and the experience it
imparts in the Manual will serve to memorialize its accomplishments, while promoting the right to a fair trail that is pivotal to
the legitimacy of the international criminal
courts that have formed in its wake.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, covers the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the
Human Rights Brief.

Internationalized Tribunals
Investigations, Misconduct, and
Uncertainty in the ECCC regardng Case 003
i

Case 003 in the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has
been surrounded by controversy since it
began in year 2009. The case has further
aggravated tensions between the international community and the Cambodian
government. Recent disputes over the
closing and subsequent re-opening of the
investigation in Case 003 and the appointment of International Co-Investigating
Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet highlight
the challenges facing the ECCC. These
tensions underscore the ongoing divide
between the tribunal’s international and
national judges and the difficulties the
ECCC will likely continue to face.
The co-investigating judges are tasked
with investigating cases brought by the
co-prosecutors and issuing charges.
Co-investigating Judges Blunk and You
closed the brief investigation in Case
003 on April 29, 2011, without issuing
indictments, despite international pressure to continue the investigation. The
judges did not indicate why they closed
the investigation, so the Office of the
Prosecutor appealed the decision, arguing that the judges should have performed
further investigations into the alleged
crimes. Subsequently, civil parties and
international NGOs accused two of the
investigating judges of misconduct. Judge
Blunk, one of the international co-investigators, resigned in late 2011, and Judge
Kasper-Ansermet was appointed in his
place as reserve international judge. Both

civil parties and international NGOs allege
that the judges post-dated documents
and failed to properly investigate
suspects who had close ties to the current
Cambodian Government.
Under Article 3 of the Agreement between
the UN and the Cambodian government
establishing the ECCC, each chamber is
composed of an equal number of national
judges and international judges. The judges
are nominated by the UN and confirmed
by the Cambodian Supreme Council of the
Magistracy. Any order or verdict issued by
the ECCC requires a majority vote, including at least one national judge. This system was designed as a compromise with
the Cambodian government in an attempt to
ensure the ECCC’s independence from the
national judiciary system. Most recently, the
Supreme Council of the Magistracy withheld
the required confirmation, thereby blocking
the nomination of Judge Kasper-Ansermet,
despite the fact that the UN approved his nomination and authorized his re-opening of the
investigation in Case 003. Because of the continual refusal of the Cambodian government
to cooperate with Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s
appointment and investigation into Cases
003 and 004, Judge Kasper-Ansermet resigned
from his appointment, effective May 4, 2012.
Although the names of suspected individuals are confidential, some information regarding the suspects in Case 003
has leaked, indicating the seriousness of
the crimes for which the accused could be
charged. After the Co-Prosecutors prematurely released the names of the suspects
in Case 003, it became evident that many
suspects still hold political positions in the
Cambodian Government, which is perhaps
why the Prime Minister of Cambodia does
not want the case to continue. However,
it is unclear why Judge Blunk sided with
national Judge You to close the investigation
in April 2011. Cambodian and international
NGOs strenuously protested the closure,
and urged the UN to investigate both judges
and to re-open the case. Judge KasperAnsermet re-opened the investigation into
Case 003 in December 2011over objections
from national co-investigating Judge You and
the Cambodian Government, who viewed the
investigation as a ploy by the international
community to influence national politics.
Citing the failure of Judge Blunk to properly investigate, Judge Kasper-Ansermet
found “good cause” to re-open the investigation. The Open Society Justice Initiative
38

(OSJI), a monitoring and reporting NGO,
argued that both Judge Blunk and national
Judge You deliberately misled the Court to
“create the illusion of a genuine investigation.” OSJI alleged that the judges added
documents to the case file and back-dated
other documents. However, the Cambodian
government asserts that the Court should
finish with Case 002 and dismiss Cases
003 and 004. Because national judges still
hold political seats in the national judicial
system, OSJI is concerned that the ability
of the court to continue the re-opened investigation will be compromised by national
political pressure and the resignation of
Judge Kasper-Ansermet.
The disagreement between the two coinvestigating judges and the ability of
the Cambodian government to force the
resignation of international Judge KasperAnsermet calls into question the credibility and independence of the ECCC. As a
result, the investigation may not be seen as
complete or in the interest of the victims.
Although the ECCC opened in 2003, only
five individuals have been accused, and
only one has been sentenced. As an international tribunal, the ECCC faces tensions
between the impartiality requirements
of international justice and the pull of
national politics. If the Cambodian government continues to block the appointment
of international judges willing to investigate Cases 003 and 004, future investigations might not occur and Case 003 may be
further delayed. The genocide perpetrated
by the Khmer Rouge regime occurred over
thirty years ago. The longer the victims
wait for justice, the less poignant it will be,
especially as the perpetrators age and their
ability to stand trial decreases.
Furthermore, the ECCC was designed
as a hybrid tribunal to ensure judicial independence and to provide a model of reform
to the ailing Cambodian justice system.
Achieving international justice objectives
such as ensuring fair trials and eliminating
impunity for crimes against humanity and
genocide are hindered if the ECCC cannot remain impartial to national political
concerns. If the pre-trial chamber and trial
chamber can break away from the international and national divide, investigations
into Case 003 may remain open, despite
Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s resignation. But
as tensions remain high, the outcome in
this case and the overall legacy of the
ECCC continues to be uncertain.
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Judgment Summaries:
International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
The Prosecutor v. Grégoire
Ndahimana, Case No.
ICTR-01-68-T
Gregoire Ndahimana was brought
to trial at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on three
counts related to crimes against Tutsis.
The Prosecution charged him with genocide or, in the alternative, complicity in
genocide, and extermination as a crime
against humanity. Ndahimana was a
member of the Mouvement Démocratique
Républicain (MDR), a political party in
Rwanda, as well as the bourgmestre of
Kivumu commune. The charges against
him concern events that took place in
Kivumu commune between April 6 and
April 16, 1994. In particular, the charges
related to attacks on the Nyange Parish,
where hundreds of Tutsis had taken refuge, that occurred on the April 15-16,
culminating in the physical destruction
of the church while the refugees were
sheltering inside of it and resulting in the
death of approximately 2,000 Tutsi men,
women and children. While a majority of the Trial Chamber found that
the Prosecution failed to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused committed, planned, instigated, or ordered
the attacks against Tutsis at the Nyange
Parish, it found that he bore superior
responsibility for the members of the
communal police who carried out the
attack on April 15, and then he aided and
abetted the attack that took place on April
16. Based on its findings that the attacks
of April 15 and 16 amounted to genocide
and extermination as a crime against
humanity, and that Ndahimana acted with
the requisite mens rea, the majority convicted him of the first and third counts
brought by the Prosecution. Because
complicity in genocide was charged only
in the alternative, the Chamber dismissed
this charge. Ndahimana was sentenced
to fifteen years in prison with credit
for time already served. Judge Florence
Rita Arrey issued a dissenting opinion
in which she contended that Ndahimana
should have been convicted for committing genocide and extermination as a
crime against humanity based on his participation in a joint criminal enterprise

(JCE) aimed at exterminating Tutsis in
Kivumu commune.
Much of the evidence put forth by
the Prosecution was intended to establish
that Ndahimana took place in a series
of meetings between April 11 and April
16 at which a JCE was formed with the
purpose of transporting a large number
of Tutsis to Nyange Parish for the purpose of exterminating them. However,
while the majority of the Trial Chamber
determined that, although the evidence
established that the accused participated
in several of the relevant meetings, and
that a JCE did exist among certain of
the other persons who attended the same
meetings, the Prosecution failed to establish that Ndahimana “shared the intent
to destroy the Tutsi population in whole
or in part.” While conceding that, in
“most cases, genocidal intent will be
proven by circumstantial evidence,” the
majority stressed that, “in such cases,
the finding that the accused possessed
the requisite mens rea must be the only
reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence.” Here, the majority could not reach such a conclusion
and thus determined that the accused
was not a member of the joint criminal
enterprise described by the Prosecution.
As stated above, Judge Arrey issued a
dissenting opinion on this point, finding that circumstantial evidence did in
fact establish that Ndahimana possessed
genocidal intent. Among other factors,
Judge Arrey pointed to the fact that the
accused “met regularly with the members
of the criminal enterprise throughout
the relevant period, before, during, and
immediately after the killings,” suggesting he “accepted the plan, and that his
participation in the enterprise was valuable, and possibly essential;” that he
failed to assign the communal police
officers under his control to protect the
refugees at the parish, despite threats
against them; and that, following the
destruction of the church on April 16,
Ndahimana and other members of the JCE
“celebrated the successful implementation of the criminal plan” over drinks.
Based on this and other evidence, Judge
Arrey concluded that “by an unknown
time on 14 April 1994 Ndahimana shared
the intent of his co-perpetrators to destroy
in part or in whole the Tutsi community
of Kivumu commune.”
39

Despite the majority’s finding that
Ndahimana lacked genocidal intent, it
nevertheless determined that he bore
responsibility for crimes committed on
April 15 and 16. With respect to the
attack on the parish on April 15, the
Trial Chamber first found Ndahimana’s
alibi evidence to be “reasonably possibly true,” and thus held the Prosecution
failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was physically present
at the parish during that day’s attack.
However, the Trial Chamber found that
the accused bore superior responsibility
for members of the communal police that
directly perpetrated the attacks on April
15. To establish superior responsibility
under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute,
the Court must find: (1) a superiorsubordinate relationship existed, meaning
that the “superior must have had effective control over the subordinates at the
time the offence was committed;” (2) the
superior knew or had reason to know that
the criminal acts were about to be or had
been committed by his subordinates; and
(3) the superior failed to take necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such
criminal acts or to punish the perpetrators. According to the Trial Chamber,
Ndahimana exercised effective control
over the communal police through his
role as bourgmestre of the commune, as
he had the authority to assign the police
to specific tasks and to promote and
demote police members. Furthermore,
the Chamber held that circumstantial
evidence established that the accused had
reason to know that the police had committed attacks against Tutsis at the parish
on April 15 resulting in the death of hundreds of Tutsi refugees, as Ndahimana
arrived at the scene several hours after
the attack and the “situation at the parish
[at that time] must have been so chaotic
that any person coming there would
have known that a large scale attack
had occurred that day.” In addition, the
Chamber noted that Ndahimana subsequently met with at least three of the
persons directly involved in the attack.
Finally, the Chamber determined that,
although Ndahimana had the authority to punish the perpetrators of the
attack, he took no action to do so. The
Chamber then went on to determine that
the April 15 attack amounted to genocide, as the physical perpetrators of the
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attack acted with the intent to destroy the
Tutsi population in whole or in part. The
Chamber also determined that the attack
amounted to extermination as a crime
against humanity, as those carrying out
the attack intended to carry out killing
of Tutsis on a massive scale and knew
that their actions formed part of a widespread attack against the civilian Tutsi
population on ethnic grounds. Thus, the
Chamber concluded that Ndahimana bore
superior responsibility for genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity
in relation to the events of April 15.
Turning to the physical destruction
of the church on April 16, the Chamber
first determined that the communal
police over whom Ndahimana exercised effective control did not participate in this attack, and thus the accused
could not be held liable for the attack
based on a theory of superior responsibility. Furthermore, while the Chamber
determined that Ndahimana was physically present for both the planning and
the execution of the April 16 attack,
as stated above, the majority of the
Chamber determined that Ndahimana did
not possess the specific intent to commit genocide and thus could not be held
responsible for genocide based on his
role committing, planning, ordering, or
instigating the destruction of the church.
Nevertheless, the majority did determine
that those responsible for carrying out
the attack did act with genocidal intent,
and that Ndahimana was aware of the
genocidal intent of those carrying out
the attack. Furthermore, the Chamber
determined that Ndahimana’s physical
presence during the attack amounted to
tacit approval or encouragement of the
attack, particularly when combined with
the fact that he did not take any action
to punish those involved in the previous
day’s attack. Thus, the Chamber determined, Ndahimana was responsible for
aiding and abetting genocide based on
the destruction of the church on April
16. The Chamber also determined that
Ndahimana aided and abetted extermination as a crime against humanity on
April 16, as he must have known that the
physical perpetrators intended to carry
out killing on a massive scale and that
their actions formed part of a widespread
attack against the Tutsi civilian population on ethnic grounds. Interestingly,

although the crime against humanity of
extermination does not require that the
accused intended to destroy a protected
group in whole or in part, the Chamber
did not consider whether Ndahimana
bore responsibility under an alternate
mode of liability, such as participation
in a JCE or planning, even though it had
dismissed those modes of liability in
relation to the genocide charges based
on a finding that the accused lacked the
requisite genocidal intent. Notably, the
Prosecution charged Ndahimana with all
forms of liability available under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, as well as under
Article 6(3).
Turning to sentencing, the majority
of the Chamber determined that fifteen
years was an appropriate sentence taking into the account the gravity of the
crime and aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. In particular, while noting that the charges of which the accused
was convicted were extremely grave,
it also took into account “the nature of
the accused’s participation.” By contrast,
because she found that the accused “was
not a mere accomplice in the genocide at
Nyange parish, but a principal perpetrator of that crime,” Judge Arrey concluded
that she would have “sentenced him to
a longer term of imprisonment than did
the [m]ajority,” but did not specify the
amount of years she found appropriate.
Erin Neff, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for
the Human Rights Brief. Katherine Anne
Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Dominique Ntawukulilyayo
v. The Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-05-82-A
On December 14, 2011 the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
judgment in the case against Dominique
Ntawukulilyayo, who served as sub-prefect of the Gisagara sub-prefecture in
Rwanda from 1990 through 1994. In
August 2010, the Trial Chamber found
Ntawukulilyayo guilty of genocide pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute of
the Tribunal for his role in the mass killings of Tutsis at Kabuye Hill on April
40

23, 1994. Although Ntawukulilyayo was
originally charged with genocide, complicity in genocide, and direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, the Trial
Chamber only convicted the accused
of genocide. Specifically, the Chamber
found that, by instructing Tutsi refugees
to move from Gisagara Market to Kabuye
Hill and by transporting soldiers to the
hill who subsequently killed hundreds
of these refugees, Ntawukulilyayo was
guilty of ordering and aiding and abetting
the killings. For his participation in these
events, the Trial Chamber sentenced
Ntawukulilyayo to twenty-five years’
imprisonment. Because the Prosecution
had charged complicity in genocide as
an alternative charge to genocide, the
Trial Chamber dismissed that count upon
determining that the accused was guilty
of genocide; the direct and public incitement to genocide charge was dismissed
based on a lack of evidence supporting
the charge. On appeal, Ntawukulilyayo
raised six challenges to his conviction
and sentence. In part, he alleged that
the Trial Chamber erred in finding that
he instructed Tutsi refugees to move
to Kabuye Hill and that he transported
soldiers to the hill who later committed
the attack. Ntawukulilyayo also alleged
that the he had not been given sufficient notice as to the charge of ordering
genocide as a specific mode of liability. Ntawukulilyayo asked the Appeals
Chamber to acquit him on all counts or
significantly reduce his sentence. In its
judgment, the Appeals Chamber affirmed
the conviction for aiding and abetting
genocide but reversed the conviction
for ordering genocide and consequently
reduced Ntawukulilyayo’s sentence to
twenty years’ imprisonment.
Ntawukulilyayo did not succeed in
contesting the Trial Chamber’s finding
that he arrived in Gisagara on the afternoon of April 23, 1994, gathered Tutsi
refugees in the market, and ordered them
to move to Kabuye Hill. Ntawukulilyayo
challenged the testimony of Prosecution
witnesses, claiming that they neither corroborated one another nor were credible in their own right, and also challenged the finding that the testimony
of the seven Defense witnesses who
claimed not to have seen him in the market was of limited probative value. The
Appeals Chamber found that although
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the accounts of the Prosecution witnesses did contain a minor discrepancy
as to whether or not Ntawukulilyayo
used a megaphone to address the refugees in the market, they contained a
significant number of similarities. Thus,
the Appeals Chamber determined that
the Trial Chamber did not err in finding
the testimony “consistent and convincing” and also agreed that the discrepancies could reasonably be explained
by varying vantage points and the passage in time. Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber recalled that the Trial Chamber
has the discretion to decide “whether
corroboration is necessary and to rely on
uncorroborated, but otherwise credible,
witness testimony.” Similarly, although
Ntawukulilyayo attacked the credibility
of two Prosecution witnesses for inconsistencies between their testimony in this
trial and the earlier Kalimanzira trial,
the Appeals Chamber found that the
Appellant failed to demonstrate that the
Trial Chamber improperly assessed the
variances. Ntawukulilyayo argued that
the testimonies contained fundamental
discrepancies as to the date and time that
he allegedly arrived at the market and
the number and category of security personnel that were with him and therefore
should not have been considered credible.
However, the Appeals Chamber agreed
with the Trial Chamber that any inconsistencies could reasonably be explained
by the passage of time and other “varying circumstances” and recalled that “the
purpose of appellate proceedings is not
for the Appeals Chamber to reconsider
the evidence and arguments submitted
before the Trial Chamber.” It also was not
persuaded by Ntawukulilyayo‘s argument
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding
that the testimony of Defense witnesses
who never saw Ntawukulilyayo at the
market did not cast sufficient doubt on
the Prosecution’s case. It determined that
none of the Defense witnesses were in
a position to observe the market during
the entire time in question and found “no
error in the Trial Chamber’s preference
for positive eyewitness testimony.”
Ntawukulilyayo was also unsuccessful in arguing that the Trial Chamber
erred in finding that he arrived at Kabuye
Hill in the late afternoon or early evening of April 23, 1994 with Callixte
Kalimanzira and an unknown number

of soldiers, stopped briefly at the hill
to drop off the soldiers, and left shortly
thereafter. Ntawukulilyayo again argued
that Prosecution witnesses did not provide credible testimony and that the Trial
Chamber failed to properly assess the
exculpatory evidence submitted by the
Defense. The Appeals Chamber found
that the Trial Chamber did in fact address
the variances in witness testimony as
to the time of day that Ntawukulilyayo
arrived at the hill, the type of vehicle
he arrived in, the number and category
of security personnel with him, and the
presence of Kalimanzira. Therefore, it
considered the issue on appeal to be
“whether [the testimonies] differ to such
extent as to render the testimonies of
the witnesses incompatible with one
another.” As to time of day, although
the Appeals Chamber found that the
Trial Chamber should have more explicitly addressed the discrepancies, it noted
that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that
Ntawukulilyayo arrived “[i]n the late
afternoon or evening of Saturday 23
April 1994” reflects that it was aware of
the inconsistencies and was satisfied with
the explanation that that these differences
could be explained by the passage of time
and the traumatic nature of the events.
As to the type of vehicle Ntawukulilyayo
arrived in, the number and category of
security personnel with him, and the
presence of Kalimanzira, the Appeals
Chamber considered Ntawukulilyayo’s
claim that the Trial Chamber ignored
material inconsistencies in testimony to
be similarly unfounded. It found that
“varying vantage points, the passage of
time and the traumatic nature of the
events” were indeed reasonable explanations for these minor differences in
testimony.
Although the Appeals Chamber found
that Ntawukulilyayo did not successfully demonstrate that the Trial Chamber
erred in any of its factual findings, it
did find that Ntawukulilyayo was not
given sufficient notice as to the charge
of ordering genocide. It considered that
the lack of notice effectively meant that
Ntawukulilyayo was not given adequate
opportunity to raise a defense to the
charge at trial and that the Trial Chamber
therefore erred in holding him responsible for ordering the killings on Kabuye
Hill. Paragraph 5 of the Indictment stated
41

that “the accused . . . is individually
responsible for the crimes of genocide
or complicity in genocide because he
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of these
crimes” and concluded with a statement
that “[t]he particulars that give rise to
[Ntawukulilyayo’s] individual criminal
responsibility are set forth in paragraphs
6 through 22.” While these later paragraphs outline the particular acts that
are the basis for the charges of committing, instigating, and aiding and abetting
the killings on Kabuye Hill, they do
not plead material facts that specifically
describe how Ntawukulilyayo ordered the
killings. At trial, the Prosecution argued
that the general mention in Paragraph
5 of ordering as a mode of liability
was sufficient to put Ntawukulilyayo on
notice that he was charged with ordering
the events described in subsequent paragraphs, including the killings on Kabuye
Hill. On review, the Appeals Chamber
began by recalling that “the charges
against an accused and the material facts
supporting those charges must be pleaded
with sufficient precision in an indictment
so as to provide notice to the accused.” It
did not agree that the general language
of the Indictment in the preamble clearly
indicated that ordering as a mode of
liability was intended to apply to all of
the specific events outlined in later paragraphs. Even considering the Indictment
as a whole, the Appeals Chamber also did
not find that the material facts pleaded in
the rest of the Indictment reasonably lead
to the conclusion that Ntawukulilyayo
was charged with ordering the killing.
It found that none of the references to
Ntawukulilyayo giving orders “involve
[him] ordering anyone to kill members
of the Tutsi group at Kabuye Kill, or
otherwise ordering an act or omission
with the awareness of the substantial
likelihood that Tutsis would be killed at
Kabuye Hill in the execution of that order
by the persons who received it.” Since
“[a] Trial Chamber can only convict the
accused of crimes that are charged in
the Indictment,” the Appeals Chamber
granted Ntawukulilyayo’s appeal on this
ground and reversed the Trial Chamber’s
conviction for ordering genocide.
In light of the fact that its decision
to reverse the conviction for ordering
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genocide removed the only direct — as
opposed to accessorial — form of responsibility for which Ntawukulilyayo had
been found guilty, the Appeals Chamber
reduced his sentence to twenty years’
imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber
also confirmed that the sentence will be

Charles Taylor Convicted
All Charges

on

On April 26, 2012, the Trial Chamber
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) delivered a judgment against
Charles Taylor. The SCSL is the first
internationalized court to convict a head of
state since the Nuremberg trials following
World War II. The indictment was issued
on March 7, 2003 and the case commenced
on June 4, 2007. Charles Taylor was convicted of eleven charges, including crimes
against humanity, violation of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed between November
30, 1996 and January 18, 2002, when the
Court had jurisdiction. Although the trial
phase is over, many issues remain, including subsequent appeals and compensation
for the victims.
Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPLF) from 1989 to 1997
and was the president of Liberia from 1997
to 2003. In addition to participating in
and leading the civil war in Sierra Leone,
Taylor also participated in the civil war in
Liberia, where he backed and helped lead
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone
were closely related in terms of political ideology, guerilla tactics and players.
Additionally, both conflicts were bloody
and gruesome, leading to the death of an
estimated 50,000 people in Sierra Leone
and leaving thousands of others mutilated
by rebel tactics that included cutting off
limbs as punishment. Both countries are
still fragile and many still fear Taylor’s
ability to control events in West Africa.
After his indictment and subsequent arrest,
Liberia and Sierra Leone requested his
transfer to the Hague.
The Defense acknowledged that during
the indictment period under the jurisdiction of the court, November 30, 1996 to
January 18, 2002, crimes against humanity

further reduced by the period of time
that Ntawukulilyayo has already spent in
detention since his arrest in October 2007.
Sara Harlow, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for

and war crimes were committed, but
claimed that Taylor had no responsibility.
The Prosecution had to prove, “(i) that the
crimes were actually committed; (ii) that
the crimes fulfill all the legal elements of
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute; and (iii)
that there is a nexus between the alleged
crimes and the Accused.” The prosecution
presented evidence of forced rape, amputations, the trafficking of illegally mined
diamonds known as blood diamonds, arms
deals, and embezzlement. Throughout the
trial, 115 witnesses testified about the
atrocities committed during the civil war
under Taylor’s supervision and direction,
the alleged diamond trading, and Taylor’s
financial embezzlement during his reign as
president. The witnesses included victims,
former child soldiers and U.S. nationals.
Taylor testified on his own behalf over the
course of seven months.
The Trial Chamber found Charles
Taylor guilty of all eleven counts in the
indictment. The eleven charges included:
acts of terrorism, murder, violence to life,
harm to the health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, rape, sexual slavery,
outrages upon personal dignity, violence
to life, other inhumane acts, conscripting
or enlisting children under the age of 15
years into armed forces, enslavement, and
pillage. The Trial Chamber also examined
evidence of events that occurred prior
to the Indictment period to establish “by
inference the elements of criminal conduct
that occurred during the material period,
or demonstrating a consistent pattern of
conduct.” In light of the evidence prior to
and during the indictment period, the Trial
Chamber found that Taylor provided support and arms and ammunition to the RUF
and that he directed military personnel.
Sufficient evidence also linked Taylor to
the blood diamond trade with the RUF. In
conclusion, the Trial Chamber found that
Taylor “was aware of the crimes committed by RUF/AFRC forces against civilians…as early as August 1997.”
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the Human Rights Brief. Katherine Anne
Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Article 6(3) of the Statute states that a
superior is responsible for the actions of
subordinates “if the superior knew or had
reason to know that his or her subordinate
was about to commit crimes prohibited
by the Statute or had done so, and the
superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent or punish the perpetrators.” The Trial Chamber
found that although Taylor had “substantial
influence” over the RUF, he did not have
“effective command,” so he was not criminally responsible for crimes under Articles
2, 3 and 4 committed by subordinates.
Additionally, the Trial Court found that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor “participated in a
common plan” to commit crimes alleged in
the Indictment, so he was not found guilty
of Joint Criminal Enterprise. However,
the Trial Chamber found that prosecution
did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
under Article 6(1), Taylor is guilty of aiding and abetting and planning the commission of the crimes in the Indictment.
As the Charles Taylor case draws to a
close, issues concerning reparations for
victims as well as the role of the Court in
the reconciliation process of Sierra Leone
are now at the forefront. The SCSL has
already sentenced eight other leaders, but
the success of the Court in terms of bringing relief for the victims is questioned.
Because Taylor’s fortune amassed during
the civil war has not yet been discovered,
it is difficult to envision financial reparations for the victims. However, while the
Court may not be able to bring compensation to the victims, this case has set the
important precedent that a head of state
may be convicted by an international tribunal and brought to justice.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Internationalized
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.

